



















































The emergence of new political opti-
ons in Croatia over the past couple of 
years has endangered the long-stan-
ding, stable political duopoly of the 
two strongest parties, the Croatian 
Democratic Union (Hrvatska demo-
kratska zajednica, HDZ) and the Social 
Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska 
1 The paper was presented at IAMCR confe-
rence in Cartagena, Colombia, in July 2017.
partija Hrvatske, SDP). The most im-
portant among them is the Bridge of 
Independent Lists (Most nezavisnih 
lista, Most), which won 19 seats in the 
2015 parliamentary election and 13 in 
the 2016 early parliamentary election. 
The results of these two elections in-
troduced Most as the third strongest 
political option in the country, both in 
terms of the number of received votes 
and the seats in the parliament, which 
consequently gave them the key to a 
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Abstract The main goal of the paper is to establish to which extent it is justified 
to label a newly established Croatian party The Bridge (Most) a populist party. in 
order to answer this question, the paper relies on theoretical, methodological and 
empirical insights from contemporary literature on populism. The study is based on 
inclusive approach to populism and accordingly developed categories for content 
analysis. The analysis only partially confirms the assumption that Most is a populist 
option. The authors suggest that Most is best described as a combination of cen-
trist populism and an anti-establishment reform party. They suggest that populism 
research would benefit from distinguishing between anti-elitist and anti-establish-
ment position of parties and politicians. finally, they argue that the ‘curiosity’ of 
Most stems primarily from their awkward and paradoxical relationship towards Cro-
atian political elite: Most’s politicians criticise political elite for being incompetent 
and corrupt, while at the same time advocating alliance with this same elite in order 
to implement reforms and bring prosperity to Croatian society.
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parliamentary majority and formation 
of the Government.
Numerous political analysts and jour-
nalists, as well as most of their political 
opponents, have labelled Most a populist 
party. Using recent theoretical, meth-
odological and empirical insights from 
contemporary political science litera-
ture on populism, the goal of this paper 
is to investigate to which extent, if at all, 
it is justified to consider Most a popu-
list option. Moreover, if Most indeed is 
a populist party, we want to establish the 
nature of their populism, especially in 
the light of an ongoing discussion about 
different types of populism, which per-
meates an important part of contempo-
rary populism research.
In the theoretical part of the paper we 
first briefly present the most important 
contemporary approaches to populism, 
and then we elaborate our inclusive 
approach to populism. After that we 
describe the political context of parlia-
mentary elections in 2015 and 2016. In 
the empirical section of the paper we 
explain the methodology used to estab-
lish if and in what ways Most could be 
considered a populist option. Then we 
present the results of the research and 
answer the main research question: is 
Most a populist party and what is the 
nature of their populism? Finally, we 
outline some of the insights that stretch 
beyond the specific case of Most that 
call for a more nuanced conceptualis-
ation of anti-elitism, as one of the two 
key dimensions of populism.
Contemporary approaches 
to populism
Populism is one of the most promis-
cuous terms in contemporary political 
science which has been colloquially used 
to describe pretty much everything. Po-
liticians frequently use it to attack the 
"demagoguery and unrealistic promi-
ses" of their opponents, while political 
analysts and journalists mostly use it to 
critically address the activities of diffe-
rent, usually new, political parties and 
politicians. In this paper we focus on 
contemporary scientific understandings 
of populism and we seek to answer the 
following questions: what is populism, 
what kind of political phenomenon is 
populism and when is it justified to label 
someone a populist? A review of con-
temporary literature on populism, whi-
ch includes the studies published in the 
last two decades, indicates that there are 
several research approaches to the phe-
nomenon, two of which have prevailed.2
The first approach understands pop-
ulism as a specific form of political rhet-
oric or style available to different social 
and political groups. Proponents of this 
approach insist that populism is a "tacti-
cal device" (Jagers and Walgrave 2007) 
for attracting public support which is 
built around a rhetoric of simplicity and 
directness and that the only common 
feature of populist movements is peo-
ple-centrism (e.g. Kazin 1995; Tarchi 
2002; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Moffitt 
2014, 2016). A paradigmatic example of 
such understanding is the work of Jagers 
and Walgrave (2007: 322) who define 
populism "as a political communication 
style of political actors that refers to the 
people". They argue that "these political 
actors can be politicians and political 
parties, but also movement leaders, in-
terest group representatives and jour-
nalists" who acquire a "communication 
frame that appeals to and identifies 
with the people, and pretends to speak 
2 For a detailed overview of different rese-
arch approaches to populism that include 
understandings that stretch beyond the two 
dominant conceptions see Grbeša and Šalaj 
(2018a). These other approaches include, 
for instance, understandings of populism 
as a type of party organisation, strategies 
of political mobilisation, specific political 



















































in their name" (2007: 322). Similarly, 
Kazin (1995) determines populism as a 
type of political communication used by 
those who claim to speak in the name 
of the people and who represent the in-
terests of the "ordinary" citizens, regard-
less of their ideological views. Scholars 
who align with such approach believe 
that different populist movements lack 
common core values and the amount of 
common features required for populism 
to be treated as a political ideology.
On the contrary, the second dominant 
approach to populism believes that pop-
ulism expresses certain ideas about how 
modern politics should look like, which 
is why it is reasonable to treat it as a po-
litical ideology. Such an understanding 
is engraved in perhaps the most influ-
ential contemporary definition of pop-
ulism, provided by political scientist Cas 
Mudde. He claims that populism is "an 
ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homoge-
nous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which 
argues that politics should be an expres-
sion of the volonté générale (general will) 
of the people" (2004: 543).
Most scholars who share this view of 
populism as a political ideology (for ex-
ample, Canovan 2002; Akkerman 2003; 
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008; Stan-
ley 2008; Kessel 2015) rely on Michael 
Freeden’s understanding of political 
ideology. According to Freeden (1996, 
2003), political ideologies serve as con-
ceptual maps of the political world that 
make it easier for citizens to think polit-
ically. Each ideology has a fundamental 
structure with several interrelated con-
cepts. Thereby ideologies differ less in 
terms of the concepts they use and more 
in terms of the way in which they inter-
pret and combine them.
So, to what extent does populism meet 
these conditions? Do different populist 
movements have common features that 
allow for populism to be treated as a po-
litical ideology? The idea that society is 
divided into two homogenous, mutually 
antagonistic groups – honest people and 
corrupt elites – underlies all definitions 
that see populism as a political ideolo-
gy. Populism emphasizes the unity and 
homogeneity of the people, but also the 
homogeneity of the political elite. The 
key feature of populism, as opposed to 
other political ideologies, is that it con-
siders all differences between individ-
uals, such as differences in class, race, 
social status, profession or any other 
socio-economic or socio-cultural char-
acteristic, irrelevant in relation to the 
common antagonistic position towards 
political elites. Although it is acknowl-
edged that there are declarative differ-
ences between particular political elites, 
the actual differences between them are 
non-existent. According to such under-
standing, populism can be both "left" 
and "right", progressive and reaction-
ary, which largely depends on the po-
litical and economic context in which 
it is manifested, as well as on the values 
of the opposing elites. It is exactly these 
differences between populist actors and 
movements that make some researchers 
reject the understanding of populism as 
a political ideology and treat it merely as 
a political-communication style.
It seems obvious that populism does 
not have the same level of intellectual 
consistency, refinement, and compre-
hensiveness as is the case with "real" 
ideologies such as liberalism, Christian 
democracy or social democracy. How-
ever, this is where the concept of "thin 
ideology", originally coined by Michael 
Freeden’s (1998, 2003) and adopted 
by a number of scholars (e.g. Mudde 
2004; Stanley 2008), steps in. Freeden 
originally developed it in relation to na-
tionalism while musing whether nation-
























ideology, since it does not respond to a 
number of important social and politi-
cal issues to which "true" ideologies seek 
to respond. According to Freeden, "thin" 
ideology has, like mainstream ideology, 
a recognizable morphology, but, unlike 
mainstream ideology, this morphology 
is very limited. Applying the concept 
of "thin" ideology to populism, Stan-
ley (2008) argues that populism differs 
from comprehensive or complete ide-
ologies because it does not have a clear 
programmatic core and can thus take 
very different empirical guises. In spite 
of that, Stanley argues that populism 
can and should be regarded as a sepa-
rate, "thin" ideology in which central 
and privileged position belongs to the 
people.
In order to avoid the style vs. ideology 
dilemma, and yet to emphasize that pop-
ulism is a set of specific political ideas 
shared by all populist actors, a group of 
researchers has developed an ideational 
approach to populism (Mudde and Kalt-
wasser 2017; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 
2018), which is essentially identical to 
the "thin" ideology approach. Hawkins 
and Kaltwasser (2018) claim that idea-
tional approach sees populism as a spe-
cific set of ideas which evolves around 
central idea that politics is a "Manichean 
struggle" between the people and the 
elites. They believe that distinctiveness 
of the populist idea is in the combina-
tion of positive sentiments towards the 
people and people's will and negative 
sentiments towards the political elites.
Inclusive approach to populism3
One possibility to reconcile the stylis-
tic and ideational approach is to suggest 
that populism is a "matter of degree" 
rather than to understand it exclusive-
3 This chapter is based on the study Šalaj 
and Grbeša (2017) and the book chapter 
"Textual Analysis: Candidates and Parties 
in Croatia" (Grbeša and Šalaj 2018b). 
ly as a style or as an ideology (see Pau-
wels 2011; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). 
Such grading approach typically re-
volves around a set of indicators that en-
able the identification of different levels 
of populism, ranging usually from "light 
populism," which pretty much considers 
populism to be a communication style, 
to "heavy populism" which embodies 
populism as an ideology.
We build on the idea that populism 
may be graded, but we move beyond the 
practice of investigating either "light" or 
"heavy" populism. We develop a research 
design that simultaneously investigates 
populism both in an ideational and sty-
listic sense. The value of such "inclusive 
approach" is that it can process both the 
"usual suspects" of populism and main-
stream politicians who resort to popu-
list communication, occasionally or fre-
quently, depending on given social and 
political circumstances. In other words, 
it develops criteria to identify true ide-
ational populists and to distinguish them 
from populist-style politicians.
At the centre of this inclusive model is 
Mudde’s definition of populism, which 
suggests that populism has two main 
dimensions – a positive evaluation of 
the people and negative evaluation of 
political elites. In order for someone to 
be labelled populist, both these dimen-
sions should be present. In other words, 
using Goertz's (2008) notion about 
constitutive features, we argue that the 
presence of both features represents a 
necessary and sufficient condition to 
identify someone as populist in an ide-
ational sense. However, if references to 
people are present, but without clearly 
expressed resentment towards the elites, 
we cannot talk about populism in an 
ideational sense, but merely about pop-
ulist style. There are, of course, cases in 
which anti-elitism is not accompanied 
by positive references to the people or is, 




















































references to the people. We argue that 
neither of these cases can be categorized 
as populism, but rather as "techno cracy" 
or "anti-establishment politics". This 
anti-establishment orientation, along 
with demand for reforms and an inno-
vative approach to party organization, 
represents a distinctive feature of anti- 
establishment reform parties (Hanley and 
Sikk 2016). We shall return to this later 
in the paper.
Conceptually speaking, populism un-
derstood as an ideology is "broader" than 
populism as a political-communicative 
style, because, apart from the positive 
reference to the people, it contains the 
dimension of diffuse, general political 
anti-elitism. However, it is clear that 
these two understandings "overlap" in 
one of the defining features: people-cen-
trism. Therefore, we find it plausible to 
conceptually and operationally reconcile 
these two understandings so that the fre-
quent positive mentioning of the people 
or the use of specific linguistic figures 
aimed at familiarising with voters (Jagers 
and Walgrave 2007; Šalaj and Grbeša 
2017) point to the presence of populism 
as a political-communication style, while 
simultaneous presence of positive evalu-
ation of the people and negative evalua-
tion of political elites points to the pres-
ence of populism as a political ideology.
In sum, our inclusive approach is es-
sentially based on an ideational under-
standing of populism, but it combines it 
with a stylistic understanding to make 
a clear distinction between true pop-
ulist politicians and mainstream pol-
iticians who resort to populist style, 
but who are essentially not populists. 
People-centeredness and attachment 
to "ordinary people" is what these two 
understandings have in common. What 
fundamentally differentiates them is an 
antagonism towards political elites that 
is always present with true populist, but 
is missing from the discourse of popu-
list-style mainstream politicians.
The Context of the 2015 
and 2016 elections
Parliamentary elections in Croatia are 
held every four years and they basica-
lly represent an interchange of power 
between the conservative Croatian De-
mocratic Union (HDZ) and the leftist 
Social Democratic Party (SDP).4 HDZ 
governed from 1990 until 2000 when it 
was replaced by a leftist coalition led by 
the SDP that was in power until 2003. 
The HDZ then took over again and go-
verned until 2011, when it was again re-
placed by the SDP and its partners, who 
were in power until 2015. In the 2015 
parliamentary election, the newly esta-
blished party of Most, led by Božo Pe-
trov, a psychiatrist and mayor of a small 
town of Metković in the south of Croa-
tia, unexpectedly won 19 parliamentary 
seats and rattled the cage of the HDZ 
and the SDP.5
The media hailed them for breaking 
a long-standing political "duopoly" and 
achieving "what the third parties have 
been failing to do for the past 15 years". 
They called them "a sensation" and "the 
real winners" of the 2015 parliamentary 
elections.6 Since neither of the two major 
4 Description of the context was derived from 
electoral analysis published by Grbeša and 
Šalaj (2017). 
5 The Bridge of Independent Lists (Most) was 
established in 2012 in the small town of 
Metković, where the leader of Most, Božo 
Petrov, overthrew the long-time mayor and 
"local sheriff" Stipe Gabrić Jambo. By 2015, 
it had developed into a network of indepen-
dent lists from all parts of Croatia, trans-
forming itself into a strong political option, 
attractive to voters from both the left and 
the right. 
6 N.N. Most je najveće iznenađenje izbora: 
Najviše glasova je zapravo oteo HDZ-u. 

























parties, SDP and the HDZ, won the nec-
essary majority to form a government, 
Most used its newly acquired blackmail 
potential to side with the conserva-
tive HDZ and decide the winner of the 
election. Most seemingly conditioned 
its support on the implementation of 
"reforms" and insisted on the appoint-
ment of a non-party Prime Minister. 
In the end, this leader materialized in 
the figure of Tihomir Orešković, a suc-
cessful manager from multinational Is-
raeli pharmaceutical cooperation Teva, 
and a member of the Croatian diaspo-
ra. Tomislav Karamarko, leader of the 
HDZ at the time, had to satisfy himself 
with the position of First Deputy Prime 
Minister. However, the ongoing conflict 
between the HDZ and Most inevitably 
led to the rapid collapse of a cabinet that, 
according to Raos (2016), "was built 
upon a structurally unstable quasi-coa-
lition arrangement. The parties involved 
showed an utter lack of mutual trust and 
agreement on key policies". Karamarko 
consequently stepped down as party 
leader and soon afterwards he was re-
placed by Andrej Plenković, a promising 
career diplomat who had been a mem-
ber of the European Parliament since 
2013.
An early election, held in September 
2016, resulted in a narrow victory by the 
HDZ which did not manage to estab-
lish a government on its own and had 
to come to an agreement with its diso-
bedient partner – Most. The HDZ won 
61 seats in this election, leaving it in a 
somewhat better position than in 2015 
(when it won 59 seats). Most lost some 
of its support and returned 13 seats. The 
second deal between these two parties 
was closed by appointing Božo Petrov 
as President of the Parliament (Hrvats-
ki sabor) and granting ministerial posi-
tions to four other prominent members 
of Most.7 The partnership between Most 
7 Croatia has a unicameral parliament whose 
and the HDZ remained tense, mostly 
due to Most’s schizophrenic attempts to 
act as the opposition while in Govern-
ment. In April 2017, only three weeks 
before the local elections, the so called 
"Agrokor affair" finally brought this 
troubled partnership to an end. Agrokor 
is a concern that employs around 60,000 
people across Southeastern Europe.8 It 
was established by Ivica Todorić, a Cro-
atian tycoon known as "Gazda" (The 
Boss), who owned 95 percent of the 
company. Under the weight of debts 
and dubious business philosophy, the 
company came to the verge of collapse. 
The Government swiftly passed a law, 
known as "Lex Agrokor", which enabled 
the state to intervene and save the com-
pany representing one of the backbones 
of Croatian economy. At that point, the 
opposing SDP demanded the resigna-
tion of the Finance Minister, Zdravko 
Marić, who used to be a highly-po-
sitioned manager in Agrokor before 
joining the Government in 2015. They 
claimed that Marić was familiar with the 
company’s problems, but still said and 
did nothing about it. Although Marić 
denied any knowledge of the company’s 
troubles, the SDP called a no-confidence 
vote in the parliament. Most supported 
their request, leading Plenković to fire 
three of Most’s ministers from the Gov-
ernment, while the fourth voluntarily 
resigned. A no-confidence vote held on 
4 May ended in a tie (75 MPs in favour 
151 representatives are elected through a 
proportional electoral system. A parlia-
mentary majority requires the support 
of at least 76 MPs. In 2016, HDZ’s parlia-
mentary majority included representatives 
from HDZ, representatives from Most, 
representatives of national minorities, rep-
resentatives from Milan Bandić 365 – Party 
of Labour and Solidarity, a representative 
from the Croatian Democratic Assembly of 
Slavonija and Baranja (HDSSB) and a rep-






















































and 75 against), keeping Marić in office 
but leading Božo Petrov to resign from 
the post of the President of the Croa-
tian Parliament. "In this moment, I feel 
morally right in front of God and the 
people, because I was protecting their 
interests to the last minute", said Petrov 
upon resigning. Plenković then made a 
deal with the liberal Croatian People’s 
Party (HNS) who had nine MPs who 
all entered the Parliament as part of the 
opposition People’s Coalition (Narodna 
koalicija), led by the SDP. Four of HNS’ 
MPs regarded the deal with the HDZ as 
political treason, refusing to support the 
Government. They were consequent-
ly expelled from the party, but the five 
MPs who were obedient were enough 
for Plenković to secure parliamentary 
majority.
Research design
Building on the premise that populist 
discourse is reflected in communica-
tion practices of politicians, parties and 
movements, the decision was made to 
base our study on a content analysis of 
statements given by the most promi-
nent representatives of Most published 
in the country’s major newspapers and 
magazines (see Appendix). Although 
most studies of populist discourse are 
conducted on party manifestos or other 
forms of official party materials (party 
election broadcasts, etc.), we argue that 
mediatized discourse is more revealing 
or generally, less guarded. Hence, it is 
reasonable to assume that statements 
will capture the fundamentals of poli-
ticians’ discourse. On the other hand, 
the biggest limitation of statements 
as research materials is the immanent 
presence of the media filter which needs 
to be acknowledged and properly ad-
dressed by researchers.
The whole sample includes two sets 
of statements of the most prominent of-
ficials of Most. The first set includes 57 
statements that appeared throughout the 
2015 election campaign (from 1 Septem-
ber to 8 November 2015, the election 
day) and in the period after the election, 
until the constitution of the Parliament 
(9 November to 23 December, 2015). 
The second set includes 81 statements 
that appeared throughout the 2016 elec-
tion campaign (from 1 July to 11 Sep-
tember 2016, the election day) and in 
the period after the election, until the 
constitution of the Parliament (12 Sep-
tember to 30 September 2016). The unit 
of analysis is a statement, whereas we dif-
ferentiate between 1) interview (which 
is treated as one unique statement); 2) 
paraphrased statement (that includes all 
paraphrased words of a politician men-
tioned in the article) and 3) statement as 
a direct quote (that includes all quoted 
words of a politician mentioned in the 
article). The agreement between coders 
was strong across all categories. It ranged 
from Cohen's kappa = .769 to 1.00.
The codebook is structured around 
three analytical dimensions – peo-
ple-centeredness, anti-elitism and the 
presence of "dangerous others". Within 
the first dimension, the statements are 
first coded for the presence of references 
to the people as homogenous collectivity 
(explicitly, "the people" or by using other 
words that were treated as its synonyms 
such as "the citizens", "voters" etc.) e.g. 
References to certain segments of the 
population, such as the youth, pension-
ers or women were not treated as a ref-
erence to the people as a collectivity and 
were not included in the analysis. Cod-
ers were asked to register if at least one 
such reference is made anywhere in the 
text. If yes, the statement was then coded 
as a positive for this variable. Then they 
were asked to identify all such referenc-
es, to assign valence to each reference 
(positive, negative or neutral) and to 
count them. The predominant valence 
























recorded as the overall sentiment of the 
statement towards the people.
Building on Kumar’s (2014) analysis 
of Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign, we 
introduce the concept of "empty signi-
fiers" as an indicator of "reaching out to 
the people" (next to the use of explic-
it, positive references to the people). 
The notion of "empty signifiers" was 
originally coined by Laclau (2005) and 
refers to a word, an idea, a phrase that 
is elusive and to which people with dif-
ferent ideologies may assign different 
meanings. Kumar, for example (2014), 
demonstrates how Obama successfully 
fostered empty signifiers in his speech-
es, such as "change" or "change we can 
believe in" and "hope" that were later 
uncritically reinforced by journalists. 
Coders were instructed to write down 
all empty signifiers on a separate sheet 
of paper which were then used to illus-
trate the interpretation.
The second dimension examines 
politicians’ attitudes towards political 
elites. It is first examined through the 
presence of references to political elites 
("politicians", "politics") and the va-
lence of those references. References to 
specific politicians were registered only 
if a certain politician was mentioned as 
an example of politics or political elites 
as a whole. Coders were first asked to 
register if at least one reference to polit-
ical elites is made anywhere in the text. 
If yes, the interview was then coded as 
a positive for this variable. Then they 
were asked to identify all such referenc-
es and to assign valence to them (posi-
tive, negative or neutral). The predom-
inant valence of all references to the 
people was then recorded as the overall 
sentiment of the statement towards po-
litical elites.
Most’s relation towards political elites 
is then examined through six support-
ing categories that serve the task of de-
constructing their assumed anti-elitism 
more exhaustively. First we examine 
their efforts to reinforce the gap between 
"us" and "them" by suggesting that poli-
tics is not their core profession and that 
they should be perceived as non-profes-
sional politicians, which is something 
that, according to Heywood and Fieschi 
(2004: 302), all populists strive for. Then 
we introduce two categories that enable 
us to pin down some specific features 
of Mosts’ populism. The first one es-
tablishes if its representatives advocate 
specific policies (measures) aimed at 
reducing power and/or privileges of 
political elites (such as introduction of 
preferential voting system, salary cuts 
or similar). The second codes the state-
ments for the presence of a blackmailing 
discourse. Finally, the last three catego-
ries in this section examine if politicians 
from Most advocate coalition in their 
statements (cooperation, partnership) 
with one of the two major parties (the 
SDP or the HDZ) or, what is more, with 
both parties (through a "reform govern-
ment" or similar). It is exactly this as-
sumed paradox that an anti-elite party 
would promote a coalition with the two 
established parties that makes Most the 
curious case.
The third dimension looks at the pres-
ence of references to "dangerous others". 
"Dangerous others" are social groups 
who are perceived to threaten the unity 
and homogeneity of the average people 
because they promote certain interests, 
values and identities. Although polit-
ical elites represent dangerous others 
by definition, they are not embraced 
by our concept of the "dangerous oth-
ers." We use this label to refer to social 
groups other than political elites who 
are perceived to threaten the efforts to 
bring power and government back to 
the people. In some circumstances, im-
migrants are identified as a threat be-




















































from the domestic populace; likewise, 
ethnic and religious minorities can 
threaten the way of life and culture of 
the majority. It is in these circumstances 
that the right-wing populism, intolerant 
of the rights of minorities and immi-
grants, arises. On the other hand, if big 
foreign businesses and entrepreneurs 
are perceived as a threat, then populism 
reaches for left-wing political messages 
and policies, such as the nationalization 
of the property of foreign companies. 
Some authors argue that the presence 
of "dangerous others" should be consid-
ered the third defining feature of pop-
ulism (see Albertazzi and McDonnel 
2008). Nevertheless, such conceptual-
ization has not been broadly embraced 
mostly because it excludes and instantly 
eliminates certain cases that most re-
searches have categorized as populism. 
There are several examples of the so 
called "centrist populism" (Ucen 2007) 
such as Ivan Grubišić in Croatia (Gr-
beša and Šalaj 2014) whose populism 
lacks "dangerous others." Therefore, we 
find it reasonable to dismiss "danger-
ous others" as a necessary condition for 
someone to be labelled populist, but we 
find it very useful as a tool for defining 
different subtypes of populism.
A complete Codebook and detailed 
coding instructions are available in the 
Appendix.
Findings
Analysis of the 2015 election
The first insight concerns the visibility 
of Most in the pre- and post-election 
period. In the pre-election period, only 
16 statements from Most's prominent 
representatives were recorded, while in 
the post-election period the number of 
their statements rose to 41. This result is 
not surprising given the fact that Most 
unexpectedly won 19 seats and became 
a pivotal political option in the country. 
Neither the HDZ nor the SDP were able 
to form a parliamentary majority wit-
hout Most, which made them the num-
ber one political news in the country. 
On the other hand, it should be noted 
that Most had achieved a remarkable 
result despite its low visibility in the 
media throughout the election campa-
ign.9 Most of the statements belonged to 
Božo Petrov, the leader of Most (31 out 
of 57).
The second important insight relates 
to our first analytical dimension – peo-
ple centeredness. Table 1 one indicates 
that references to the people were de-
tected in 44% of the cases (25 out of 57). 
Only 3 statements contained positive 
evaluation of the people while all the 
other references were neutral.
It should be noted that the share of 
the references to the people was high-
er during the election campaign (in 10 
out of 16 cases compared to 15 out of 
41 in the post-election period). This 
suggests that Most’s politicians were 
less concerned with "the people" after 
the Election Day. Do the results relat-
ed to the first dimension even qualify 
Most as a populist party? Although 
people-centeredness is present in their 
discourse, it is much more moderately 
represented than in the discourse of 
some other Croatian politicians, who 
were identified as true populists in pre-
vious studies, such as Željko Kerum or 
Ivan Vilibor Sinčić (Grbeša and Šalaj 
2014, 2016).10 Most’s politicians men-
9 A computer assisted analysis of electoral 
coverage in 2015 confirms the assumption 
that Most was significantly underrepre-
sented compared to the mayor two parties 
(4.96% compared to HDZ’s 20.66% and SDP’s 
14.36%). However, this changed right after the 
election when Most was mentioned in 24.37% 
of articles (compared to HDZ’s 22.79% and 
SDP’s 18.73%). Source: data set related to 
Korenčić, Grbeša and Šnajder (2016). 
10 For instance, former mayor of Split and 
established populist Željko Kerum menti-
























tion the people, but mostly in a neutral 
way and the expressions they use tell us 
something about the type of their pop-
ulism. Although it is often argued that 
Most has a hidden right-conservative 
agenda, our analysis cannot confirm 
such assumption. Most’s politicians 
most commonly talk about "citizens", 
and then about "men," "voters," or "the 
people".
The third insight relates to the second 
defining feature of populism, which is a 
general, diffuse anti-elitism. This feature 
was detected in 49.1 % of cases (28 out of 
57 statements), although there is a signif-
icant difference between the pre-election 
and the post-election period (see Table 
of references were positive). The leader of 
Živi zid (Human Wall) Ivan Vilibor Sinčić 
mentioned the people in all the interviews 
he gave as the presidential candidate (44% 
of his interviews contained positive evalua-
tion of the people). 
2). In the pre-election period, anti-elitism 
is present in as many as 87.5% of cases 
(14 out of 16) and in the period after the 
election in 34.1% of cases (14 of 41).11 It is 
clear that anti-elitism is strongly present 
in the political discourse of Most, which 
is particularly true for the pre-election 
period when it had reached the level that 
matches the level of anti-elitism of poli-
ticians who were in the earlier studies 
identified as "true (strong) populists".12
11 E.g. "We are not interested in HDZ or SDP, 
we don't see them as separate parties but as 
the same interest group and therefore we 
don't care who is going to win" (Božo Petrov 
in: Jutarnji list, 11 October 2015). "They 
should be forced into a coalition with each 
other, to denude themselves so that people 
can see who they really are. They destroyed 
the country and they showed what they are 
capable of in the last 25 years" (Stipe Petrina 
in: Jutarnji list, 31 October 2015). 
12 Kerum resorted to anti-elitism in 45% of 
examined interviews while the absolute 
Croatian champion of anti-elitism is Sinčić 
Table 1. People-centeredness of Most in 2015
 
Pre-election period 
(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n/%
Post-election period 




to the people 
(presence and 
sentiment)
No people 6 (37.5) 26 (63.4) 32 (56.1)
Positive 2 (12.5) 1 (2.4) 3 (5.3)
Negative 0 0 0
Neutral 8 (50.0) 14 (34.1) 22 (38.6)
Total 16 (100) 41 (100) 57 (100)
Table 2. Anti-elitism of Most in 2015
 
Pre-election period 
(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n/%
Post-election period 







Positive 0 0 0
Negative 14 (87.5) 14 (34.1) 28 (49.1)
Neutral 2 (12.5) 27 (65.9) 29 (50.9)




















































The analysis of the two key dimen-
sions of populism suggests that Most 
combined a weak positive mentioning 
of the people with a strong anti-elitism. 
Anti-elitism was particularly present 
in the pre-election period, while it was 
toned down during the negotiations that 
followed the election. Table 3 shows that 
the use of the two supporting indicators 
of anti-elitism (identification as polit-
ical non-professionals and proposal of 
measures aimed at reducing the power 
of elites) was very weakly represented.13 
The blackmailing discourse was more 
strongly present, especially during the 
negotiation process with the HDZ and 
the SDP about government formation 
(e.g. "We are not going to cooperate with 
anyone who does not agree to imple-
ment reforms", Božo Petrov in: Slobodna 
Dalmacija, September, 2015).
The fourth crucial insight is related to 
the use of "empty signifiers". They are 
present in 75.4% of the cases. What is 
especially striking is their share in the 
post-election period. "Empty signifiers" 
appear in 85% of the cases (35 out of 41 
statement), compared to 50% (8 of 16), 
who criticised the elites in all the interviews 
he gave as a presidential candidate back in 
2014 (see Grbeša and Šalaj 2014, 2016). 
13 A rare example of such claims is for instance 
"I have never been interested in politics. I 
did this to express my revolt" (Božo Petrov 
in: 24sata Express, 11 December 2015). 
in the pre-election period.14 It is impor-
tant to look at the type of detected "emp-
ty signifiers" here. The most frequently 
used, absolutely dominant "empty signi-
fier" is the term "reform". The word re-
form was detected in 30 analysed state-
ments and in almost all of them it was 
used several times. The champion of the 
use of "empty signifiers" in a single unit 
of analysis was Božo Petrov, who used 
the word "reform" 12 times in his inter-
view in Jutarnji list on 11 October 2015. 
The second most frequent and related 
"empty signifier" is the phrase "reform 
government". It was detected in 16 cases. 
A simultaneous presence of both "empty 
signifiers" was found in 6 cases.15 Other 
"empty signifiers", such as "honourable 
people", "new political force", "change", 
"unity", "expert government" and "uni-
fied government" were also used but 
only sporadically.
The notion of a "reform government" 
points to the fifth insight that makes 
Most the curios case and that compli-
14 For instance, Croatian (strong) populists, 
Kerum and Sinčić, do not resort to empty 
signifiers at all while the coryphaeus of 
"moral populism", Grubišić uses them in 
46% of the interviews (Grbeša and Šalaj 
2014, 2016). 
15 E.g. "We have to stick to what we have 
been advocating from the very beginning: 
reforms, not the SDP or the HDZ, but a 
joint reform government based on con-
sensus" (Božo Petrov in: Glas Slavonije, 2 
December 2015).
Table 3. Supporting indicators of Most’s anti-elitism in 2015
Pre-election period 
(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n (%)
Post-election period 




Political non-professionals 3 (18.8) 2 (4.9) 5 (8.8)
Measures to reduce the power 
of elites 2 (12.5) 3 (7.3) 5 (8.8)
























cates any unambiguous, straight-for-
ward classification of this political actor. 
In our research, we tried to identify what 
type of political strategy and tactics were 
advocated by the leading Most politi-
cians. We were especially interested in 
how they dealt with various possibilities 
of government formation in Croatia. 
The results presented in Table 4 indicate 
that Most, expectedly and in accordance 
with their established anti-elitist rheto-
ric, rejected and excluded any possibil-
ity of political coalition or co-operation 
with the HDZ or the SDP (in all 16 ex-
amined statements) in the pre-election 
period. However, in 43.8 percent of cas-
es (7 out of 16) they mention the option 
of a "tripartite coalition" as a model of 
cooperation between all three parties, 
the HDZ, the SDP and Most.
The situation changed after the elec-
tion when Most politicians accepted the 
possibility of a political coalition with 
one of the two major parties in some 
statements (4 out of 41 statements advo-
cates the coalition with the SDP and 8 
out of 41 with the HDZ). However, the 
statements that advocate the formation 
of the tripartite government were domi-
nant. They account for 82.9% of all state-
ments in the post-election period (34 
out of 41).16 In most cases, the "reform 
16 This is how Most’s politicians justify their 
request for a tripartite coalition: "Reform 
government is the government which 
would include all the party from the two 
mayor coalitions. We cannot implement 
government" and the "tripartite govern-
ment" are understood as synonyms. 
Yet, in some statements even the gov-
ernment that would have been formed 
with only one of the two major parties 
was considered a "reform government".17 
We consider such political position of 
Most very unusual, strange and para-
doxical: after all the criticism about the 
SDP and the HDZ in the election cam-
paign, including accusations that they 
have destroyed Croatia, politicians from 
Most insist on forming a tripartite gov-
ernment with these two parties, claim-
ing it is the only way to save Croatia. 
The strong anti-elitist rhetoric that had 
been soundly articulated throughout 
the election campaign was replaced by a 
demand for unity, harmony and homo-
reforms without constitutional changes 
which require absolute parliamentary 
majority" (Ivan Kovačić in: Večernji list, 17 
November 2015). "We believe that the time 
has come to put all our divisions and differ-
ences aside and we are convinced that the 
reform government is the only way out of 
the difficult situation Croatia is in" (Božo 
Petrov in: Glas Slavonije, 27 November 
2015).
17 Our decision to treat reforms as "empty 
signifiers" may be challenged by a choice 
of our research material, because state-
ments do not, in fact, necessarily provide 
sufficient room to elaborate the content of 
reforms. However, the fact that the leading 
officials of Most cannot agree about the 
precise meaning and content of the term 
"reform government" allows us to consider 
our decision justified.
Table 4. Statements advocating coalition with the HDZ, the SDP or both in 2015
Coalition with mayor 
parties
Pre-election period 
(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n/%
Post-election period 




HDZ 0 8 (19.5) 8 (14)
SDP 0 4 (9.8) 4 (7)




















































geneity of all relevant political elites in 
Croatia.
Finally, our analysis has detected al-
most no presence of the "dangerous 
others" in the discourse of the Most’s 
leading politicians. The presence of the 
"dangerous others" has been detected 
in only two out of 57 cases (dangerous 
media and judiciary). Obviously, there 
was no systematic stigmatization of par-
ticular social or economic actors who, 
alongside political elites, threaten the 
well-being of the people. The absence of 
the "dangerous others" in their discourse 
also rejects the assumption about Most’s 
predominantly conservative values and 
thus reinforces the findings from the 
previous section.
The first part of the story about Most’s 
political profile ends with signing a deal 
with the HDZ, which lead to the forma-
tion of a coalition government of the 
HDZ and Most. However, Most started 
acting as an opposition within the gov-
ernment from day one, a situation that is 
not unusual for populist parties (Alber-
tazzi and Mueller 2013). It was that situ-
ation that led to the government collapse 
and the new election in September 2016.
Analysis of the 2016 election
The trends detected in 2015 generally 
continued in 2016, yet with a few im-
portant turns. The media visibility of 
Most was expectedly much higher than 
in 2015 and, contrary to 2015, they were 
considerably more present before the 
election (66 statements) than after the 
election (15 statements). Most’s most 
visible politician was by and large Božo 
Petrov with 51 statements, followed by 
Nikola Grmoja with 18 statements. Such 
personalized and centralized commu-
nication contradicts Most’s declarative 
attempts to position themselves as an 
alliance of independent lists, which is 
characterized by a horizontal democra-
tic organisation.
The results pertaining to two defining 
features of populism, people-centrism 
and anti-elitism, are generally consist-
ent with previous findings. Positive and 
neutral references to the people are even 
less present than in 2015 (in 34.6% of 
the statements compared to 43.8% in 
2015). Table 5 indicates that the share 
of references to the people was higher 
in the 2016 pre-election period than in 
the 2016 post-election period. Howev-
er, if we compare the results to the 2015 
campaign, we can observe that the peo-
ple had a more central position in 2015, 
when they were mentioned in 62.5% of 
the statements, than in 2016, when they 
were mentioned in 36.4% of the state-
ments.
Table 5. People-centeredness of Most in 2016
 
Pre-election period 
(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n/%
Post-election period 





to the people 
(presence and 
sentiment)
No people 42 (63.6) 11 (73.3) 53 (65.4)
Positive 13 (19.7) 4 (26.7) 17 (21)
Negative 0 0 0 
Neutral 11 (16.7) 0 11 (13.6)
























Most’s politicians remained faithful to 
their 2015 discourse regarding labelling 
of the people. They mostly used terms 
such as "citizens," "ordinary people," and 
similar.
The findings for the second constitu-
tive feature, anti-elitism, are generally 
in line with the 2015 results (see Table 
6). Negative sentiments towards elites, 
primarily the SDP and the HDZ, were 
present in 50.6% of the statements, com-
pared to 49.1% in 2015.
Table 6 suggests that anti-elitism was 
expectedly more present throughout the 
campaign in 2016 than after the election 
(in 57.5% of statements compared to 
20%). However, Most’s anti-elitism was 
overwhelmingly more present in the 
2015 than in the 2016 campaign (87.5% 
compared to 57.6%). This could be ex-
plained by the fact that they were now 
speaking from a position of a political 
elite and that their anti-elitism may not 
have sounded all that credible.
The 2016 results have conclusively 
confirmed that Most’s politicians do not 
identify themselves as political non-pro-
fessionals, which is another reason to 
think twice before labelling them "true 
populists". However, in 2016 they in-
tensified their requests to introduce 
measures that would reduce the power 
of elites (nevertheless, this happened 
exclusively in the pre-election period), 
while maintaining the same blackmail-
ing levels as in 2015 (see Table 7).
"Empty signifiers" were used in 29 
or 35.8% of the statements, which is a 
significant decrease in relation to 2015, 
when they were used in 75.4% of the 
cases. Interestingly, the word "reform", 
as the dominant empty signifier in 2015, 
Table 6. Anti-elitism of Most in 2016
 
Pre-election period 
(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n/%
Post-election period 







No elites 28 (42.4) 12 (80) 40 (49.4)
Positive 0 0 0
Negative  38 (57.6) 3 (20)  41 (50.6)
Neutral 0 0 0 
Total 66 15 81
Table 7. Supporting indicators of Most’s anti-elitism in 2016
Pre-election period 
(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n (%)
Post-election period 




Political non-professionals 3 (4.5) 0 
2 (2.5)
Measures to reduce the 
power of elites 13 (19.7) 0 13 (16) 




















































was gradually replaced by the word "as-
surance" in 2016: "Both the SDP and the 
HDZ will have to come up with great 
assurances if they want to talk about the 
prime ministerial position" (Božo Petrov 
in: Glas Slavonije, 26 August 2016). Re-
forms were still present in Most’s rheto-
ric in 2016, but mostly when prompted 
by journalists.
An examination of the references to 
"dangerous others" in 2016 has conclu-
sively confirmed that "dangerous oth-
ers" were only rarely present in Most’s 
discourse. Such remarks were found in 
only 4.9% of the cases.
Finally, the most important results for 
2016 pertain to the relationship with the 
two main parties and the cry for the re-
form government that had made Most 
the curious case in the first place (see 
Table 8).
Contrary to the 2015 election, Most 
welcomed a coalition with the HDZ 
in 34.6 of their statements (28.8% in 
the pre-election period and 60% in the 
post-election period), while cooper-
ation with the SDP was welcomed in 
19.8% of the statements (22.7% before 
and 6.7 after the election). However, the 
idea of a "tripartite coalition", which was 
aggressively promoted in 2015, disap-
peared almost entirely.
Discussion
So, what do the results presented in pre-
vious chapter tell us about Most’s politi-
cal profile? Is Most a populist party? The 
results of this study suggest that there 
are reasons to consider Most a combi-
nation of a moderate centrist populist 
party and an anti-establishment reform 
party. Moderate, because their soundly 
expressed anti-elitism was accompanied 
by resentment to identify themselves as 
political non-professionals, and comple-
mented by moderate mentioning of the 
people, with only some explicitly posi-
tive mentions; centrist, because almost 
no "dangerous others" were present in 
their discourse, and because the domi-
nant expression used to refer to the peo-
ple was "citizens"; anti-establishment be-
cause of their vocal anti-elitism, which, 
interestingly, targeted primarily the 
"established", and not all political elites, 
and, finally, reform because of their 
abundant use of the words "reforms" 
and "reform government" in the 2015. 
Evidently, their discourse embodies at 
least two of the three defining features 
of anti-establishment reform parties, as 
outlined by Hanley and Sikk (2016) – 
demand for reforms and clearly articu-
lated anti-establishment orientation. Al-
though the third feature – an innovative 
approach to party organization – was 
not the focus of our analysis, it seems 
quite convincing that Most, because of 
its continuous efforts to be perceived 




(01/09 to 08/11/2015) 
n/%
Post-election period 
(09/11 to 23/12/2015) 
n/%
Total
HDZ 19 (28.8) 9 (60) 28 (34.6)
SDP 15 (22.7) 1 (6.3) 16 (19.8)
























as a platform that connects independ-
ent lists from different parts of Croatia, 
matches all the criteria described by 
Hanley and Sikk.
The qualification of Most as an an-
ti-establishment party points to anoth-
er interesting discussion, which has 
not been given adequate attention, but 
which may have important implications 
for populism research, especially when 
it comes to parties that are rather diffi-
cult to unambiguously categorize, such 
as Most. Specifically, a detailed analysis 
of Most’s discourse suggests that their 
political anti-elitism is not so gener-
al (diffuse) as the anti-elitism of some 
other political actors in Croatia, such 
as Sinčić’s or Grubišić’s. Most’s criticism 
has been mainly directed at political 
parties that have been interchangeably 
governing Croatia since the1990s – the 
HDZ and the SDP. Most’s sentiment to-
wards other members of political elites 
is "milder" than the sentiment of the 
true populists, to the extent that Most 
claims that even certain "reasonable 
people" from the HDZ and the SDP can 
be accepted as potential political part-
ners. This all implies that we should 
make a stronger distinction between 
anti-elitism and anti-establishment. For 
instance, Drago Prgomet, who joined 
Most as HDZ’s dissident and who later 
returned to HDZ, said: "We don’t mind 
people from SDP or HDZ, as long as 
they are hardworking. In addition to the 
people who are the backbone of Most, 
we are willing to cooperate with the peo-
ple from other political options… Dis-
tinguished people can be found in other 
political options as well" (in: Večernji 
list, 16 October 2015).
A similar position was expressed by 
Božo Petrov who considered anti-elit-
ism of Marijana Puljak, the leader of the 
party Pametno (Intelligently), too radi-
cal and blamed it for the collapse of their 
pre-electoral agreement: "She wanted to 
exclude anyone who had previously had 
anything to do with politics, no matter 
how capable they were. That was unac-
ceptable for us because we believe that 
Croatia needs every capable and compe-
tent person" (in: Slobodna Dalmacija, 31 
October 2015). In other words, anti-es-
tablishment represents a milder version 
of anti-elitism because it mainly targets 
options that are or were at some point 
in power. Most by no means represents 
a unique case in that respect. In the last 
couple of years a number of options have 
emerged across Europe whose categori-
sation varies between centrist populism 
and anti-establishment reform parties. 
The best-known examples are probably 
Emmanuel Macron and his party En 
Marche! in France (Meny 2017), Andrej 




Figure 1. Barr’s modified continuum of Croatian political parties 
 
Barr’s original model categorizes different political options in relation 
to political elites and the dominant political model (i.e. representative 
democracy). If we try to place political options on the spatial continuum,
then the closest to the government (in our case the HDZ) are the political 
options that Barr calls a "loyal" opposition (in our case the SDP). These are 
the options that offer an alternative to the current government because they 
think it is incompetent, ineffective or corrupt, but they do not contest the 
idea that political elites should play a prominent role in representative 
democracies, nor do they question the model of representative democracy 
its lf. At the very end f he co tinuum are the options that Barr calls the
"disloyal" oppos tion, anti-systemic political op ions, who claim that the 
problem lies not only in the political elites, but in the entire model of 
representative democracy, which does not bring prosperity and wealth to the 
people for various reasons. Therefore, according to these options, it is not 
sufficient to change the political elite, but it is necessary to change the whole 
political system. According to Barr, all anti-elitist political options, including 
populists, are positioned somewhere between the "loyal" and "disloyal" 
opposition. They criticize all elites rather than just the ruling political elite,
but, at the same time, they do not challenge the established political model. 
Although Barr's model seems plausible, we believe that, in order to better 
explain the emergence of new political options in contemporary European 
societies, it should be complemented by the aforementioned distinction 
between anti-elitist (Živi zid)18 and anti-establishment positions (Most), as 
suggested in Figure 1. We believe that operationalization and application of 
thi  model ca  contribute o a more precise cat gorization of new political 
options that are continually emerging across the world.  
 
                                                            
18 Position of Živi zid on modified Barr’s continuum (Figure 1) is based on populism research 
conducted in Croatia in the last couple of years, which iden ified Živi zid as a true po ulis
party  (Grbeša and Šalaj 2014, 2016, 2018b; Mustapić  and Hrstić 2016). However, since 
Živi zid is a new political actor, there are still not enough studies to conclusively confirm 
this categorization, which thus remains open to further discussions.  
 




















































(Hanley and Sikk 2016) and Albert Ri-
vera with the Citizens (Ciudadanos) in 
Spain (Orriols and Cordero, 2016).
We believe that the distinction be-
tween anti-elitism and anti-establish-
ment is relevant and that future research 
should acknowledge this difference 
and conceptualize it adequately. Robert 
Barr’s (2009) modified continuum fea-
tured in Figure 1, represents one possi-
ble effort in that direction.
Barr’s original model categorizes dif-
ferent political options in relation to po-
litical elites and the dominant political 
model (i.e. representative democracy). 
If we try to place political options on 
the spatial continuum, then the clos-
est to the government (in our case the 
HDZ) are the political options that Barr 
calls a "loyal" opposition (in our case the 
SDP). These are the options that offer an 
alternative to the current government 
because they think it is incompetent, in-
effective or corrupt, but they do not con-
test the idea that political elites should 
play a prominent role in representative 
democracies, nor do they question the 
model of representative democracy it-
self. At the very end of the continuum 
are the options that Barr calls the "dis-
loyal" opposition, anti-systemic political 
options, who claim that the problem lies 
not only in the political elites, but in the 
entire model of representative democra-
cy, which does not bring prosperity and 
wealth to the people for various reasons. 
Therefore, according to these options, 
it is not sufficient to change the polit-
ical elite, but it is necessary to change 
the whole political system. According 
to Barr, all anti-elitist political options, 
including populists, are positioned 
somewhere between the "loyal" and 
"disloyal" opposition. They criticize all 
elites rather than just the ruling political 
elite, but, at the same time, they do not 
challenge the established political mod-
el. Although Barr's model seems plau-
sible, we believe that, in order to better 
explain the emergence of new political 
options in contemporary European so-
cieties, it should be complemented by 
the aforementioned distinction between 
anti-elitist (Živi zid)18 and anti-estab-
lishment positions (Most), as suggested 
in Figure 1. We believe that operation-
alization and application of this model 
can contribute to a more precise catego-
rization of new political options that are 
continually emerging across the world.
Although Most’s anti-establishment 
position represents a valuable incentive 
to differentiate between true populists 
and anti-establishment options, that po-
sition is not what makes it a curios case, 
since similar cases can be found in sev-
eral other European countries. It is their 
paradoxical insistence on a tripartite 
government in 2015. Most’s politicians 
insisted that only by achieving homoge-
neity and unity of political elites can the 
necessary reforms be made and that it 
was their Messianic duty to establish this 
unity: "Some analysts claim that Most's 
proposal to form the Government of 
National Unity is unrealistic because, al-
legedly, the HDZ and the SDP can reach 
an agreement without Most. Maybe this 
is true, but then the question remains 
what would happen with the SDP and 
the HDZ; what would happen with the 
implementation of reforms. Without 
Most as a moderator and a guarantor of 
the implementation of reforms, such co-
alition is not possible" (Nikola Grmoja 
in: Slobodna Dalmacija, 14 November 
2015). The task that Most’s politicians 
18 Position of Živi zid on modified Barr’s con-
tinuum (Figure 1) is based on populism 
research conducted in Croatia in the last 
couple of years, which identified Živi zid 
as a true populist party (Grbeša and Šalaj 
2014, 2016, 2018b; Mustapić and Hrstić 
2016). However, since Živi zid is a new 
political actor, there are still not enough 
studies to conclusively confirm this catego-

























had put forward was by no means an 
easy one: to transform (in their own 
words) inapt, incompetent and corrupt 
Croatian political elites into a united po-
litical force that will take Croatia, under 
the leadership of Most, on the right po-
litical and economic path. However, in 
2016 Most swiftly abandoned its Messi-
anic mission. The call for a tripartite co-
alition, or a union of the main political 
options, was first radically reduced to 
almost completely disappear from their 
rhetoric. This can be partially explained 
by poor electoral results of the SDP, 
which consequently made the coalition 
of the HDZ and Most the most realistic 
post-election scenario. However, even 
throughout the 2016 election campaign, 
Most’s politicians rarely advocated this 
option, which suggests that they entirely 
abandoned the idea of reconciling polit-
ical elites and uniting them in a mission 
of saving Croatia.
Conclusion
The political processes in contemporary 
Europe have been marked by a rise of 
the new political options that question 
the political dominance of mainstream, 
Christian-democratic, social demo-
cratic and liberal parties. Although the 
political duopoly of the main parties 
has not been terminated in Croatia, as 
it happened in France and Greece, the 
new political options have challenged 
the stability of the Croatian political 
system. The results of the 2015 and 2016 
parliamentary elections suggest that the 
most prominent newcomer was Most, 
which decisively influenced the outco-
me of both elections. Most’s success and 
its newly acquired political potential 
triggered discussions about its political 
profile and how to adequately categorize 
it. Although systematic scientific studies 
about their ideology, profile or organiza-
tion are still missing, political analysts, 
journalists and different political opti-
ons routinely tend to label them as being 
"populist".
The main goal of this paper was to ex-
amine to which extent this assessment 
of Most as a populist option is justified. 
We based our analysis on insights from 
abundant contemporary literature on 
populism. We used set of categories to 
perform content analysis of populist 
cues in the statements of Most’s most 
prominent politicians, in the periods 
surrounding the 2015 and 2016 parlia-
mentary elections. All categories were 
derived from our inclusive approach to 
populism that distinguishes between 
populism as an ideology and populism 
as a political communication style.
The results of our research only par-
tially confirm the assumption that Most 
is a populist option. Furthermore, they 
point to three important conclusions.
First, our analysis suggests that Most 
can best be described as a borderline 
case between a moderate centrist pop-
ulism and an anti-establishment reform 
party. Their moderate centrist populism 
stems from their fairly prominent an-
ti-elitism, reluctance to identify them-
selves as political non-professionals, rel-
atively low share of positive mentioning 
of the people and general absence of the 
"dangerous others" in their discourse. 
The fact that they predominantly refer 
to the people as the "citizens", addi-
tionally reinforces this finding. On the 
other hand, their position of an anti-es-
tablishment reform party is built on the 
simultaneous presence of an anti-estab-
lishment rhetoric, insistence on imple-
mentation of reforms and innovative 
approach to party organisation. Our 
research confirms the presence of the 
first two features and, although we did 
not empirically investigate the third one, 
statements from Most’s politicians sug-





















































Second, the examination of Most’s 
political profile implies that populism 
research may benefit from a more nu-
anced approach to measuring resent-
ment towards the political elites. Our 
analysis has shown that Most’s anti-elit-
ism is not as diffuse as that of "true pop-
ulists". Most’s criticism of political elites 
is mostly focused on those elites who are 
or were at some point in power, i.e. the 
HDZ and the SDP, while they are much 
more benevolent towards other political 
options. They even leave room for coop-
eration with certain "reasonable people" 
from the HDZ and the SDP. We there-
fore propose a model that differentiates 
between the anti-elitism and anti-estab-
lishment positions, for we believe it can 
contribute to a more effective categori-
zation of the new political options that 
have been emerging across the world.
Third, the "curiosity" of Most’s case is 
not in its borderline position between 
centrist populists and anti-establish-
ment reform party because similar cases 
have emerged across Europe in recent 
years. Their peculiarity stems from 
their paradoxical position of an anti-es-
tablishment reform party that wants to 
build an alliance with incompetent and 
corrupt establishment in order to car-
ry out reforms that would rescue the 
country. It is an awkward proposition, 
previously unknown in contemporary 
Europe.
Finally, our analysis shows that our 
approach to populism and its operation-
alisation may effectively differentiate 
between true populism and related phe-
nomena, such as anti-establishment re-
form parties. Such approach enables us 
to make a distinction between the cases 
that are being put in the same category 
too easily, as is the case with Živi zid and 
Most. While available studies indicate 
that the first party fits the concept of 
true populists, Most should be consid-
ered a combination of an anti-establish-
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Populizam u Hrvatskoj: čudnovat slučaj Mosta
Sažetak Glavni je cilj rada utvrditi u kojoj je mjeri novu političku opciju u hrvatskoj, 
Most, opravdano nazivati populističkom. na to pitanje autori nastoje odgovoriti ko-
rištenjem recentnih teorijskih, metodoloških i empirijskih uvida politološke litera-
ture o populizmu. analizu temelje na inkluzivnom pristupu populizmu i iz njega 
izvedenoj istraživačkoj matrici na temelju koje je provedena analiza sadržaja. anali-
za samo djelomice potvrđuje teze o Mostu kao populističkoj opciji. autori smatraju 
kako je tu opciju najprikladnije kategorizirati kao kombinaciju centrističkog popu-
lizma i antiestablišmentske reformske stranke. Tvrde da bi istraživanja populizma 
trebala razlikovati antielitizam od antiestablišmentske pozicije stranaka i političa-
ra. Zanimljivost Mosta vide i u njegovu čudnom i paradoksalnom odnosu prema 
hrvatskoj političkoj eliti: mostovci kritiziraju političku elitu kao nekompetentnu i 
korumpiranu, a istodobno zagovaraju politički savez s tom istom elitom kako bi se 
provele reforme i donio prosperitet hrvatskom društvu.
Ključne riječi  hrvatska, Most nezavisnih lista, analiza sadržaja, populizam, populi-

































































 1. Božo Petrov
 2. nikola Grmoja
 3. Miro Bulj
 4. ivan Kovačić
 5. drago Prgomet – only for period 1
 6. stipe Petrina – only for period 1
 7. robert Podolnjak
 8. ines strenja linić
 9. ivica relković




1. 01/09 to 08/11/2015
2. 09/11 to 23/12/2015
3. 01/07 to 11/09/ 2016
4. 12/09 to 30/09/2016
References to the people
4. What is the predominant sentiment of the statement towards the people?




Note 1: Include and code all collective terms such as citizens, inhabitants, community, Croatian society, 
Croats, public, voters etc. Do not include references to particular segments of population (e.g. youth, 
women, pensioners).
Note 2: Write down all references pertaining to the people on a separate sheet of paper.
5. Does the actor use "empty signifiers" (e.g. reform, justice, change, common 
good)? Write down all "empty signifiers" you were able to identify in the 
statement/interview.
1. Yes (which ones?)
2. no
Note1: Code 1. Yes if at least one such reference is present in the interview. You do not need to count the 
references.
Note 2: Write down all detected "empty signifiers" on a separate sheet of paper. Assign interview ID to 

























6. What is the predominant sentiment of the statement towards political elites?




Note 1: Include and code only if the reference pertains to elites as collectivity (politicians in general or 
‘politics’). References to actual parties, politicians or the government should be included only if a certain 
party, politician or a group of politicians (government, for instance) is used as a proxy for political elites.
7. Does the statement advocate specific policies (measures) that would redu-




8. Does the statement contain blackmailing discourse?
1. Yes
2. no
9. Does the politician refer to himself/herself as a "political non-professional"?
1. Yes
2. no
Note: "Political professionals" are politicians who see their political activities as central to their professio-
nal life. "Political non-professionals" are politicians who see their political activities as something occasi-
onal, something which is not their core business and something that they will do for a limited period of 
time (because their core profession is something else, business or similar).








12. Does the statement advocate coalition (cooperation, partnership) of the 





13. Does the politician make a reference to "dangerous others"?
1. Yes
2. no
Note: "Dangerous others" are individuals or groups who do not belong to the people and who represent 
the threat to prosperity of the people (e.g. the media, financial institutions [banks, corporations etc.], 
minorities, EU …). Write down who these "dangerous others" are.
